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Age, Period and Cohort Effects on Social 
Capital 
Philip Schwadel, University of Nebraska–Lincoln 
Michael Stout, Missouri State University 
Abstract
Researchers hypothesize that social capital in the United States is not just 
declining, but that it is declining across generations or birth cohorts. Test-
ing this proposition, we examine changes in social capital using age-period-
cohort intrinsic estimator models. Results from analyses of 1972–2010 Gen-
eral Social Survey data show 1) that informal association with neighbors 
declined across periods while informal association with friends outside of 
the neighborhood increased across birth cohorts; 2) that formal association 
was comparatively stable with the exception of relatively high levels of for-
mal association among the early 1920s and early 1930s birth cohorts; and 
3) that trust declined considerably across both periods and cohorts, though 
the oldest cohorts are less trusting than those born in the 1920s through 
the 1940s. While the results suggest that changes in social capital are more 
complex than the simple decline depicted by many researchers, the aspects 
of social capital that have declined may be essential for promoting social 
and political participation. 
Introduction 
Democratic societies flourish when there is a vibrant public sphere where 
citizens have a voice that is capable of exercising some influence over the po-
litical decisions that affect their lives (Habermas 1991). In the past 15 years, 
much scholarly attention has been paid to the decline of social capital and the 
accompanying detrimental effects on civil society. Social capital, defined as 
digitalcommons.unl.edu
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the resources embedded in social networks characterized by trust and reci-
procity, is pivotal to the civic health of a democratic society (Putnam 2000). 
Putnam (2000), for example, found that communities with high levels of so-
cial capital have more efficient political structures and political elites that 
are more responsive to the needs of their citizens. He also found that resi-
dents of communities that are high in social capital show greater levels of 
civic engagement and participation in politics. High levels of social connect-
edness make it is easier to mobilize people to address public issues (e.g. es-
tablishing a hazardous waste facility, reducing a crime problem, or build-
ing a community park) and to make arrangements that benefit the group as 
a whole (e.g. a child care cooperative among low-income mothers, a micro-
lending group that enables poor people to start businesses, or farmers band-
ing together to share expensive tools and machinery; Putnam 2000; Wool-
cock and Narayan 2000). Given the centrality of social capital to individual 
outcomes, community welfare and democratic vigor, it is vital that social sci-
entists establish if social capital is, in fact, declining. 
Changes in social capital can occur across time period and/or across 
birth cohorts, though proponents of the decline in social capital thesis gen-
erally suggest that changes occur across birth cohorts (e.g. Brehm and Rahn 
1997; Putnam 1995, 2000). This proposition comports with generational the-
ories of social change that emphasize the role of birth cohorts in human de-
velopment (Alwin and McCammon 2007). As Mannheim (1952:290) noted, 
“individuals who belong to the same generation, who share the same year of 
birth, are endowed, to that extent, with a common location in the historical 
dimension of the social process.” The distinct socialization processes asso-
ciated with each generation promote social change (Ryder 1965), and, thus, 
the expectation of cohort-based changes in social capital. 
While the theoretical emphasis is on cohort changes in social capital, pre-
vious research has been unable to adequately disentangle period and cohort 
effects (e.g. Putnam 2000; c.f. Wilkes 2011). Addressing this problem, in this 
article we simultaneously estimate age, period and cohort effects on three 
domains of social capital – informal association, formal association and trust. 
Our analysis replicates and extends previous research with more up-to-date 
data, an improved method of estimating age, period and cohort effects and 
a wider range of measures of social capital. This analysis addresses the the-
oretical expectation of across-cohort declines in social capital that previous 
research has been largely unable to empirically verify. 
Changes in Social Capital 
Although Putnam may be the most popular proponent of the decline in so-
cial capital thesis, he is not the first sociologist to examine social capital. 
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Coleman (1988) and Bourdieu (1986), for example, both wrote extensively 
about social capital, as well as other forms of capital. Similarly, though they 
did not employ the term social capital, Bellah and his colleagues (1985) de-
tailed the growth of a new kind of individualism, which they say has broken 
down traditional forms of social interaction that were based on cooperation 
and dense social ties within communities. These authors argued that tradi-
tional forms of social interaction are being replaced by new ways of social-
izing that are more likely to be based on self-interest and individual pref-
erences. Their argument about the causes and consequences of declines in 
social cohesion is fundamentally based on the same logic as Putnam’s de-
cline in social capital thesis. 
While Putnam (2000) argued that social capital – operationalized 
through informal association (i.e., socializing with friends and relatives), 
formal association (i.e., voluntary organization membership) and general-
ized trust – is declining, there is considerable debate surrounding changes in 
social capital. Much of this criticism is based on the ways in which Putnam 
and others measures social capital (e.g. Schudson 1996; Stolle and Hooghe 
2005). Some critics contend that decreases in the more commonly measured 
forms of social capital are offset by increases in alternative forms of social 
capital (e.g. Costa and Kahn 2001; Ladd 1999). For instance, while member-
ship in traditional voluntary organizations has declined, advances in com-
munication technology and the Internet have facilitated the creation of new 
types of voluntary organizations (Ray 1999). Similarly, others argue that 
some domains of social capital may decline while others do not (e.g. Paxton 
1999; Wuthnow 2004). Consequently, Costa and Kahn (2001) concluded that 
the extent of decline in social capital has generally been overstated. 
Periods and Birth Cohorts 
Inconsistent results from analyses of changes in social capital may be par-
tially due to the failure to simultaneously account for both period and co-
hort changes. Putnam (1995, 2000) and others (e.g. Brehm and Rahn 1997; 
Robinson and Jackson 2001) have argued that declines in social capital gen-
erally occur across generations or birth cohorts. If social capital is declin-
ing across birth cohorts, then failure to account for potential changes across 
cohorts may lead to biased estimates of time trends. Apparent changes over 
time may be underestimated or exaggerated due to the relative age of spe-
cific birth cohorts (Miller and Nakamura 1996). For instance, the dispropor-
tionately large Baby Boom generation, which is distinctive in its activities 
and viewpoints (Schwadel 2011), may distort apparent changes over time. 
Thus, analyses of changes over time that do not account for changes across 
cohorts may lead to misleading expectations of social change. 
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Putnam (2000) proposed that generations born before 1930 have consid-
erably higher levels of social capital and civic engagement throughout their 
lives than do generations born since 1930. Americans who experienced the 
Great Depression and World War II, he says, are the most civically active. 
More recent generations, on the other hand, are less likely to volunteer and 
do not contribute to the production of social capital to the same extent as 
older generations. He attributed the cause of this generational shift to the 
increasing role played by technology in people’s lives, especially the popu-
larity of television (Putnam 1995). 
Although Putnam (2000) pointed to generational differences in social 
capital, he acknowledged that his analysis technique could not differenti-
ate age, period and cohort effects. Other empirical research, however, lends 
some support to the notion of generational decline in social capital. For in-
stance, Robinson and Jackson’s (2001) findings suggest that trust has de-
clined across generations. Unfortunately, their study was limited to one 
aspect of social capital, and their “additive” model may not provide stable es-
timates of period and cohort effects (Glenn 1981). Wilkes (2011) employed a 
more appropriate modeling strategy and also found that trust declines across 
cohorts, though her findings are limited because she did not report uncon-
trolled age, period and cohort effects for individual measures of trust, and 
her analysis also focused on a single aspect of social capital. Avoiding the 
problems associated with age-period-cohort (APC) models, Rotolo and Wil-
son (2004) compared the voluntary behavior of two successive generations 
of women at the same age. Similarly, Jennings and Stoker (2004) focused 
on intergenerational changes in trust and civic activity with the use of lon-
gitudinal data. Though informative, these longitudinal studies are limited in 
their ability to estimate period-based changes. In sum, empirical evidence 
suggests potential across-cohort declines in social capital, but previous re-
search is hampered by its focus on a single domain of social capital (i.e., in-
formal association, formal association or trust) and by modeling techniques 
that are unable to satisfactorily disentangle period and cohort effects. 
Following Putnam (2000), we expect that the “long civic generation” – 
the cohorts that came of age before and during the World War II period (i.e., 
born before 1930) – will exhibit the highest levels of social capital. The baby 
boomers, born between 1946 and 1964, who came of age during the polit-
ically tumultuous era of the Vietnam War and the Civil Rights Movement, 
should exhibit significantly lower levels of social capital than prior cohorts. 
We expect the decline in social capital to continue for members of Genera-
tion X (Jennings and Stoker 2004), born between 1965 and 1980, because 
research suggests that Generation X is relatively unengaged due to declining 
idealism and an increased sense of economic risk and vulnerability (Kiesa et 
al. 2007). Kiesa and colleagues (2007), however, observed that members of 
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the millennial generation, born in the 1980s and later, have exhibited higher 
levels of civic engagement, which might indicate a corresponding increase 
in social capital. They attributed this increase in civic engagement to an in-
crease in deliberate organizing efforts by civic organizations and a more in-
tense political environment spurred by the events of September 11, 2001. 
Therefore, we expect to see a steady across-cohort decline in social capital 
beginning with cohorts born after 1930, with the possibility of an increase 
in social capital among those born in the 1980s. 
Despite the focus on generational declines in social capital, there are 
also good reasons to expect period-based changes in social capital. For in-
stance, events that took place in the 1960s and 1970s, such as the Vietnam 
War, the Civil Rights Movement and Watergate, may have led to decreased 
levels of trust in the United States (Putnam 2000). More recently, the terror-
ist attacks of September 11, 2001, may have served to increase civic engage-
ment (Kiesa et al. 2007) and social trust (Smith, Rasinski and Toce 2001). 
Indeed, Gross, Aday and Brewer (2004) reported a spike in social trust im-
mediately following September 11, 2001, as well as a moderate decline in 
social trust the following year. Economic changes and economic inequality 
may also lead to period-based changes in social capital. Uslaner (2002), for 
example, argued that increasing levels of economic inequality over the last 
30 years have made the public increasingly cynical and less trusting. Sup-
porting this argument, Rothstein and Uslaner (2005) found that countries 
with the greatest levels of economic equality are disproportionately trust-
ing. On the other hand, Dalton (2005) argued that explanations of declines 
in political trust that emphasize period effects are inadequate since trust in 
government differs by attributes that vary across cohorts – especially ed-
ucation – and the erosion of trust in government is greatest among young 
adults. Dalton’s study suggests that the combination of generation-specific 
socialization processes and cohort changes in levels of education account 
for the erosion of trust. 
In this article, we address the possibility of both period and cohort 
changes in social capital with an APC analysis. By simultaneously model-
ing age, period and cohort effects on social capital, we can establish if there 
were cohort- and/or period-based changes in trust, formal association (i.e., 
civic participation) and informal association (i.e. interacting with neighbors, 
friends and relatives). We expand upon previous research (1 by employing a 
recently developed analysis technique – intrinsic estimator models (Fu 2000) 
– for simultaneously estimating age, period and cohort effects, (2 by analyz-
ing multiple indicators of social capital that take into account characteris-
tics of trust, social networks and voluntary association and (3 by updating 
previous research on social capital with data from 1972 to 2010. 
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Data and Methods 
We use 1972 through 2010 General Social Survey (GSS) data to analyze age, 
period and cohort effects on social capital. The GSS is a nationally represen-
tative survey of noninstitutionalized U.S. adults conducted annually or bi-
ennially since 1972 (Smith, Marsden and Hout 2011). The survey is primar-
ily administered in-person though some interviews are completed over the 
phone. Response rates range between 70 percent and 80 percent across sur-
vey years.1 The sample size differs across models due to variation in which 
dependent variables are included in each survey. All analyses are weighted 
to account for the subsampling of nonrespondents as well as the number of 
adults per household and other survey-specific sampling variations. Follow-
ing previous research on social capital using GSS data (e.g. Paxton 1999), 
we employ measures that assess informal association activity, formal asso-
ciation participation and generalized trust.2 
Dependent Variables 
Informal association is measured with three indicators of frequency of so-
cializing activities. Respondents are asked how often they spend a social eve-
ning with relatives, with someone who lives in their neighborhood and with 
friends who live outside of their neighborhood. Response options are never 
(1), about once a year (2), several times a year (3), about once a month (4), 
several times a month (5), once or twice a week (6) and almost every day (7). 
A single variable, which denotes the number of different types of volun-
tary organizations respondents belong to, is used to assess formal associa-
tion participation. The GSS asks a series of questions about membership in 
different types of voluntary organizations. We create a count of the num-
ber of different types of voluntary organization memberships from the fol-
lowing list: fraternal groups, service clubs, veterans’ groups, political clubs, 
sports groups, youth groups, high school service groups, hobby or garden 
clubs, school fraternities or sororities, nationality groups, farm organiza-
tions, professional or academic societies, church-affiliated groups, literary, 
art, discussion, or study groups and “any other” groups.3 Because only two 
percent of respondents have more than six types of voluntary organization 
memberships, we recode the voluntary organization membership variable 
so it ranges from zero for no memberships to seven for seven or more types 
of memberships. 
We use three dichotomous measures of trust. The GSS asks respondents 
if they believe people are helpful, people are fair and people can be trusted.4 
Response options are agree, disagree and depends. We recode these variables 
so agree is coded one and disagree/depends is coded zero. 
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Independent Variables 
Although the choice of intervals is somewhat arbitrary, 5-year birth cohorts 
and periods are the norm in APC analyses (Yang et al. 2008). Consequently, 
we code age, period and birth cohort into five-year intervals.5 We group re-
spondents 80 years old or older into a single category for more stable esti-
mates. Respondents younger than 20 years old are deleted from the sample. 
Analysis Techniques 
We test for APC effects with intrinsic estimator models (Fu 2000). The cen-
tral problem with APC analyses using repeated cross-sectional data is the 
linear dependency among age, period and cohort (i.e., period = age + co-
hort). Age, period and cohort measures cannot be simultaneously included 
in a standard regression model due to this linear dependency, and cohort ef-
fects are unreliable without including age in the model. Researchers choose 
various methods of avoiding the linear dependency among age, period and 
cohort measures. These methods largely rely on subjective choices of model 
constraint, which can lead to divergent and even conflicting estimates de-
pending on the assumptions made (Fu 2008). 
APC intrinsic estimator models, on the other hand, allow for the simulta-
neous modeling of age, period and cohort effects without subjective choices of 
model constraint. APC intrinsic estimator models provide unbiased estimates 
of regression coefficients for age groups, time periods and birth cohorts (Yang, 
Fu and Land 2004). Unlike other techniques, the constraints imposed by APC 
intrinsic estimator models are unrelated to the investigators’ knowledge of 
the subject and the variables in the model; instead, the constraints are a func-
tion of the number of periods (Fu 2008; Yang, Fu and Land 2004). The intrin-
sic estimator is a special form of principal components regression estimator 
that adjusts for the linear dependency among age, period and cohort through 
singular value decomposition of matrices (Yang, Fu and Land 2004). Thus, 
correlated variables are orthogonally transformed into linearly uncorrelated 
variables. As Yang and colleagues (2008:1707) note, “The basic idea of the IE 
is to remove the influence of the design matrix on coefficient estimates.” APC 
intrinsic estimator models are more statistically efficient than methods that 
use prior information to constrain data to avoid the linear dependency prob-
lem, and they meet Glenn’s (2005) criteria for an acceptable, general-purpose 
method of simultaneously estimating APC effects (Yang et al. 2008). Intrinsic 
estimator models appear to provide more methodologically accurate (Yang et 
al. 2008) and theoretically appropriate (Schwadel 2010) results than other 
methods of estimating APC effects (see Yang et al., 2008, for a detailed dis-
cussion of properties of the intrinsic estimator). A logit link function adjusts 
for dichotomous outcomes in the models of trust. 
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Results 
Informal Association 
Results from APC intrinsic estimator models of frequency of informal as-
sociation are reported in the first three columns of Table 1 and depicted in 
Figure 1. Age has a strong, negative effect on each of the informal associ-
ation measures. The negative effect of age levels off at about 40-44 years 
of age for the measures of spending evenings with neighbors and relatives. 
On the other hand, age has a relatively linear, negative effect on spending 
evenings with friends outside of the neighborhood. For instance, control-
ling for period and cohort effects, evenings spent with friends outside of the 
neighborhood declines from almost five (several times a month) for the 20 
to 24 years of age group to just over three (several times a year) for those 
80 years of age or older. 
The results in Table 1 and Figure 1 also reveal meaningful period and 
cohort changes in informal association. There is no period-based decline in 
spending evenings either with relatives or with friends outside of the neigh-
borhood. In fact, the results suggest modest increases in spending evenings 
with relatives and friends across time periods. Conversely, there is a notable 
decline in the frequency of spending evenings with neighbors from the first 
period to the 1991-95 period, though there is little change from the 1991-
95 period to the 2006-10 period (Figure 1b). The cohort effects also differ 
across measures of informal association. There is relatively little cohort-
based change in spending evenings with neighbors or spending evenings 
with relatives. On the other hand, there is a sizable across-cohort increase 
in spending evenings with friends outside of the neighborhood (Figure 1c). 
For instance, the estimated difference between the 1902 and 1982 cohorts 
is more than two fifths of a standard deviation in the measure of spending 
evenings with friends outside of the neighborhood. 
We highlight two important aspects of the informal association results. 
First, and most importantly, these results do not suggest overall declines 
in informal association. Second, there are considerable differences in pe-
riod and cohort effects across the three measures of informal association. 
While there is a period-based decline in spending evenings with neighbors, 
there is a cohort-based increase in spending evenings with friends outside 
the neighborhood.  
Formal Association Participation 
Turning to formal association, results from an APC intrinsic estimator model 
of number of types of voluntary organization memberships are reported in 
the fourth column of Table 1. Age has a strong, curvilinear effect on formal 
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Table 1. Age-Period-Cohort intrinsic estimator models of frequency of evenings with neigh-
bors, frequency of evenings with friends outside the neighborhood, frequency of evenings 
with relatives, and voluntary organization memberships.
 Evenings with  Evenings with  Evenings with  Voluntary  
 neighbors   friends   relatives  organizations 
	 β	 SE	 β	 SE	 β	 SE	 β	 SE	
Age 
20-24 .72 .05*** 1.06 .04*** .38 .04*** -.19 .05***
25-29 .23 .04*** .63 .03*** .31 .03*** -.12 .04**
30-34 .02 .04 .34 .03*** .14 .03*** .13 .04**
35-39 -.02 .04 .15 .03*** .01 .03 .25 .05***
40-44 -.10 .04** -.01 .03 -.15 .03*** .36 .05***
45-49 -.17 .04*** -.03 .03 .00 .03 .09 .06
50-54 -.14 .04*** -.13 .03*** -.01 .04 .11 .06
55-59 -.20 .05*** -.21 .04*** .01 .04 .06 .06
60-64 -.19 .05*** -.21 .04*** .02 .04 -.19 .06***
65-69 -.03 .05 -.21 .04*** -.04 .04 -.10 .05
70-74 -.01 .06 -.34 .05*** -.18 .05*** -.18 .06***
75-79 -.01 .07 -.41 .05*** -.17 .06** -.06 .07 
80+ -.09 .07 -.63 .05*** -.32 .06*** -.16 .07* 
Period 
1972-75 .29 .04*** -.07 .03* .03 .03 .12 .04**
1976-80 .14 .04*** -.06 .03* -.03 .03 -.02 .03
1981-85 .08 .03** -.01 .02 -.07 .03** -.04 .03
1986-90 -.05 .03 -.06 .02* -.07 .03** -.03 .03
1991-95 -.15 .03*** .05 .02* -.04 .03 .07 .03* 
1996-00 -.13 .03*** .04 .02* -.01 .02 
2001-05 -.09 .05 .08 .04* .10 .04** -.09 .05 
2006-10 -.09 .04* .02 .03 .09 .03** 
Cohort 
1892 -.01 .22 -.11 .22 -.14 .21 -.37 .15* 
1897 -.22 .17 -.27 .15 -.22 .14 .14 .13 
1902 -.29 .11** -.36 .09*** .03 .09 -.10 .09 
1907 -.19 .09** -.35 .07*** -.11 .08 -.15 .07* 
1912 .09 .08 -.20 .07** -.02 .07 -.05 .07 
1917 .08 .07 -.03 .06 .05 .06 .08 .06 
1922 .18 .06** .00 .05 .04 .05 .20 .07**
1927 .04 .06 -.08 .05 .00 .05 .08 .07 
1932 .04 .06 .01 .05 -.04 .05 .23 .07***
1937 .02 .05 .05 .04 -.04 .05 .00 .06 
1942 .03 .05 .11 .04** -.03 .04 .01 .06 
1947 .05 .04 .08 .03* -.08 .04* .07 .05 
1952 .07 .04 .13 .03*** -.03 .03 -.05 .05 
1957 .04 .04 .12 .03*** .06 .03 -.13 .04**
1962 .10 .04* .11 .03*** .00 .03 .00 .05 
1967 .05 .05 .03 .04 .04 .04 .06 .06 
1972 .09 .06 .19 .04*** .05 .04 -.10 .09 
1977 -.10 .07 .19 .05*** .06 .05 .07 .26 
1982 -.09 .10 .31 .07*** .19 .07** 
1987 .02 .14 .09 .11 .18 .11 
Constant 3.42 .02*** 3.83 .02*** 4.54 .02*** 1.57 .02*** 
N 30,922  30,922  30,922  19,360 
* p ≤ .05 ; ** p ≤ .01 ; *** p ≤ .001 (two-tailed test) 
SE = standard error.
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Figure 1. Estimated age, period and cohort effects on frequency of evenings with neighbors, 
frequency of evenings with friends outside the neighborhood and frequency of evenings with 
relatives. Figure graphs results in Table 1. Height of each chart equivalent to 1.0 standard de-
viations in the measure of evenings with neighbors, 1.3 standard deviations in the measure of 
evenings with friends, and 1.2 standard deviations in the measure of evenings with relatives. 
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association. The number of types of voluntary organization memberships 
increases from 20-24 years of age to 40-44 years of age, and then decreases 
with additional years of age. The period effects on voluntary organization 
memberships are erratic, with higher than average voluntary organization 
membership in the 1972-75 and 1991-95 periods. Surprisingly, the number of 
voluntary organization memberships did not increase in the 2001-05 period 
(which, due to intermittent inclusion of the voluntary organization member-
ship questions, is based solely on the 2004 GSS). This finding suggests that 
increases in civic participation immediately following September 11, 2001, 
may have been ephemeral (Gross et al. 2004). The cohort effects show that 
respondents born in the inter-war years, particularly the 1922 and 1932 co-
horts, have relatively high numbers of voluntary organization memberships, 
and the 1892, 1907 and 1957 cohorts have relatively few. Overall, number 
of types of voluntary organization memberships varies only moderately by 
birth cohort and by period, and these moderate changes do not suggest de-
clines in social capital.  
Trust 
Results from APC intrinsic estimator models of trust are reported in Table 
2 and depicted in Figure 2. As Figure 2a shows, the youngest respondents 
are the least likely to agree that people are helpful, people are fair and peo-
ple can be trusted. Age has a relatively linear, positive effect on the view that 
people are helpful and fair while the view that people can be trusted peaks 
at 45-49 years of age. The effects of age on the view that people are helpful 
and fair are robust. Specifically, the probability of agreeing that people are 
fair ranges from .45 for the youngest respondents to more than .65 for the 
oldest respondents, and the probability of agreeing that people are helpful 
ranges from .4 for the youngest respondents to more than .55 for the old-
est respondents. 
The results in Table 2 and Figure 2b also show large period effects on 
individual trust. Controlling for age and cohort effects, the probability of 
agreeing that people are fair declines from a high of .62 in the 1976-1980 
and 1981-85 periods to a low of about .54 in the 2001-05 and 2006-10 peri-
ods. The decline in agreeing that people can be trusted is even greater, go-
ing from a probability of .43 in the 1981-85 period to a probability of .33 in 
the most recent period. Conversely, though the probability of agreeing that 
people are helpful varies across periods, there is no suggestion of an over-
all decline. 
The across-cohort declines in trust are even more striking than the pe-
riod-based declines. As Figure 2c and the bottom portion of Table 2 show, 
controlling for age and period effects, there are large across-cohort declines 
in all three measures of individual trust. Other than a few exceptions among 
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Table 2. Age-Period-Cohort intrinsic estimator models of view that people are helpful, 
people are fair and people can be trusted.
      People         People       People Can  
      Helpful          Fair       be Trusted 
 β SE	 β SE	 β SE	
Age 
20-24 -.37 .05*** -.49 .05*** -.34 .05***
25-29 -.27 .04*** -.25 .04*** -.25 .04***
30-34 -.19 .04*** -.25 .04*** -.19 .04***
35-39 -.07 .04 -.06 .04 .04 .04 
40-44 -.08 .04* -.02 .04 .14 .04***
45-49 .04 .04 .02 .04 .18 .04***
50-54 -.03 .04 .01 .05 .06 .04
55-59 -.06 .05 .01 .05 .04 .05 
60-64 -.01 .05 .05 .05 .09 .05 
65-69 .16 .05** .13 .05* .04 .05 
70-74 .19 .06*** .18 .06** -.02 .06 
75-79 .38 .06*** .28 .07*** .10 .06 
80+ .30 .06*** .39 .07*** .11 .06 
Period 
1972-75 -.04 .03 .07 .03* .19 .03***
1976-80 -.01 .03 .17 .03*** .13 .03***
1981-85 .12 .04** .16 .04*** .22 .04***
1986-90 .02 .03 .09 .03** -.01 .03 
1991-95 -.01 .03 -.05 .03 -.15 .03*** 
1996-00 -.10 .03*** -.14 .03*** -.12 .03*** 
2001-05 .07 .05 -.16 .05*** -.09 .05 
2006-10 -.05 .04 -.15 .04*** -.18 .04*** 
Cohort 
1892 -.03 .21 -.15 .22 -.20 .22 
1897 -.16 .13 .09 .14 -.05 .13 
1902 .02 .10 .11 .11 .09 .10 
1907 -.08 .08 -.09 .09 -.06 .09 
1912 .08 .07 .17 .08* .05 .07 
1917 -.03 .06 .12 .07 .04 .06 
1922 .30 .06*** .15 .06* .22 .06*** 
1927 .25 .06*** .15 .06** .15 .06** 
1932 .23 .06*** .14 .06* .22 .06*** 
1937 .24 .05*** .12 .06* .11 .05* 
1942 .29 .05*** .24 .05*** .29 .05*** 
1947 .25 .04*** .18 .04*** .29 .04*** 
1952 .10 .04* .02 .04 .15 .04*** 
1957 .00 .04 -.04 .04 .01 .04 
1962 -.02 .04 -.07 .04 .01 .05 
1967 -.15 .05** -.11 .05* -.10 .05* 
1972 -.19 .06*** -.24 .06*** -.28 .07*** 
1977 -.31 .07*** -.33 .07*** -.35 .08*** 
1982 -.42 .10*** -.32 .09*** -.23 .11* 
1987 -.37 .14** -.16 .14 -.35 .17* 
Constant -.02 .02 .31 .02*** -.50 .02*** 
* p ≤ .05 ; ** p ≤ .01 ; *** p ≤ .001 (two-tailed test) 
N = 32,622; results reported in logged odds. SE = standard error.
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Figure 2. Estimated age, period and cohort effects on view that people are helpful, people 
are fair and people can be trusted. Figure graphs results in Table 2.   
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the youngest two cohorts, each cohort born since the 1950s is less likely than 
the preceding cohort to agree that people are fair, people are helpful and 
people can be trusted. For instance, the probability of agreeing that people 
are helpful declines from between .55 and .56 for those born in the 1920s 
through 1940s to between .39 and .40 for those born in the 1980s. It is im-
portant to note, however, that the cohorts born before the 1920s are less 
trusting than those born in the 1920s through 1940s. Specifically, the proba-
bilities of agreeing that people are helpful and that people can be trusted are 
notably smaller for cohorts born before the 1920s. Overall, the results show 
that trust in individuals, unlike informal and formal association, declined 
considerably across birth cohorts beginning with those born in the 1950s. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
The above results clarify the effects of age, period and birth cohort on key 
measures of social capital in the United States. Age is strongly associated 
with each measure of social capital. Older Americans have lower levels of 
informal association and higher levels of trust than do younger Americans. 
Age has a curvilinear effect on civic participation – the oldest and youngest 
adults report the fewest voluntary organization memberships. In contrast 
to the widespread view that social capital has declined, the results show 
relatively little change in either informal or formal association. While so-
cializing with neighbors declined across periods, the frequency of socializ-
ing with friends outside of the neighborhood increased across birth cohorts. 
Supporting previous research on trust (e.g. Jennings and Stoker 2004; Rob-
inson and Jackson 2001; Wilkes 2011),6 we find that trust declined across 
birth cohorts. Aside from a slight increase in trust among the 1980s cohorts, 
each cohort born since the 1950s is less trusting than the previous cohort. 
The decline in trust, however, is not solely due to differences across cohorts. 
There were also large period-based declines in trust. These results do not 
show declines in all indicators of social capital, but they do show that trust 
has declined considerably, and the decline in trust occurs both across co-
horts and across periods. 
Although the above results show that cohort changes do not always com-
port with theoretically motivated generations, there is considerable align-
ment with generational expectations. We aggregated the cohort effects re-
ported in Tables 1 and 2 into the generations proposed by Putnam (2000) to 
facilitate interpretation of the results.7 Figure 3 shows the number of stan-
dard deviations from the mean for each generation for continuous variables 
and the difference in predicted probability from the mean for each genera-
tion for dichotomous variables. While there is only moderate cohort-based 
variation in number of types of voluntary organization memberships (Table 
S chwadel  &  Stout  in  So cial  Forces  9 1  (2012)      15
1), Figure 3 suggests that members of the pre-boom generation belong to a 
relatively high number and wide range of voluntary organizations. Indeed, 
the 1922 and 1932 cohorts are the only two cohorts with an average num-
ber of organization memberships that is significantly greater than the mean 
(Table 1), and the pre-boom generation comprises the 1922, 1927 and 1932 
cohorts. These results support Jennings and Stoker’s (2004) comparison of 
cohorts using longitudinal data. 
There is also relatively little cohort-based variation in the informal as-
sociation measures of spending evenings with relatives and with neighbors 
(Table 1). Figure 3, however, suggests that members of the millennial gen-
eration are relatively likely to spend evenings with relatives. This finding 
should be interpreted with caution though since the 1987 cohort – one of 
the two cohorts that comprise the millennial generation – has a large stan-
dard error in the model of evenings with relatives, resulting in an insig-
nificant effect. In contrast, there are large cohort effects on spending eve-
nings with friends (Table 1), and these effects aggregate into clear growth 
in spending evenings with friends across generations (Figure 3). While the 
long civic generation falls .11 standard deviations below the mean in spend-
ing evenings with friends, the millennial generation is almost .13 standard 
deviations above the mean. In sum, although there are notable generational 
differences in formal and informal association, these changes do not sug-
gest generational declines in social capital. 
Figure 3. Generational differences from mean. Figure aggregates results from Table 1 and 
Table 2. Figure shows number of standard deviations from mean for continuous variables 
(denoted by “#”) and difference in probability from mean for dichotomous variables (de-
noted by “†”).    
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The picture is quite different when it comes to trust. As Figure 3 shows, 
there are considerable generational differences in trust, with the pre-boom 
generation being the most trusting. The probability of agreeing that people 
are helpful, fair and can be trusted is between .04 and .06 greater than the 
mean for the pre-boom generation. Members of Generation X and the mil-
lennial generation, on the other hand, report the lowest levels of trust. Spe-
cifically, their probability of agreeing that people are helpful, fair and can 
be trusted is between .05 and .10 below the mean. The identification of co-
hort-based changes in trust is pivotal for understanding changes over time. 
Since the baby boom generation and Generation X are far less trusting than 
the pre-boom generation, cohort replacement may lead to additional declines 
in trust in the near future (Robinson and Jackson 2001).  
Putnam’s thesis of the long civic generation (1995) proposes that de-
clines in social capital occur following the generation that matured before 
and during the Great Depression and World War II, or what he calls the 
long civic generation. The above results provide mixed support for Put-
nam’s thesis. When it comes to informal association, there is no support. In 
fact, contrary to Putnam’s thesis, there are notable across-cohort increases 
in one of the measures of informal association. In regards to formal asso-
ciation, the results suggest that members of the pre-boom generation, but 
not the long civic generation, are relatively likely to be members of vol-
untary organizations. Similarly, the trust results show that the pre-boom 
generation, but not the long civic generation, are especially trusting. These 
results do support Putnam’s contention that trust is declining across gen-
erations. In contrast to Putnam’s thesis, however, Americans born in the 
years leading up to World War II are the most trusting, and those born be-
fore the pre-boom generation, including the long civic generation, are rel-
atively untrusting and unlikely to belong to voluntary organizations. The 
baby boom generation is about as trusting as the long civic generation (Jen-
nings and Stoker 2004). 
Generalized trust is an attitude, an expression of confidence in one’s so-
cial environment, and it reflects the belief that even though we cannot per-
sonally know everyone in our society, we can be confident that there are ties, 
represented by a set of shared values, norms and obligations, that bind each 
of us to one another (Grovier 1997). Social interactions in communities and 
societies where generalized trust is prevalent operate more smoothly, and 
with less transaction cost, than when interactions are characterized by au-
thority and suspicion (Fukuyama 1995). Generalized trust lubricates social 
transactions and allows actors to form the “thin” bonds that make collec-
tive problem solving possible (Putnam 2000). In heterogeneous, hierarchi-
cally stratified modern societies, the attitude that “we’re all in this together” 
makes economic, political and social organization more manageable. As a 
result, the decline in trust will likely have a negative impact on the nation’s 
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ability to collectively address a variety of important issues. Moreover, the 
finding that trust is declining across cohorts suggests that this trend is not 
easily reversible (Dalton 2005). 
Although the above-mentioned findings on informal association do 
not suggest a decline in social capital, they do suggest potential problems 
for neighborhood cohesion. The period-based decrease in socializing with 
neighbors indicates a deterioration of social ties within neighborhoods. 
Such ties serve as resources that facilitate social organization in neigh-
borhoods. Thus, a decrease in the social ties of a neighborhood leads to an 
increase in social disorganization, which is associated with a range of so-
cial problems. For instance, lack of social ties with neighbors is positively 
associated with perceived powerlessness and alienation (Geis and Ross 
1998). On the other hand, the across-cohort increase in socializing with 
friends outside of the neighborhood has the potential to generate opportu-
nities and resources for individuals and communities. The disproportion-
ately high frequency of socializing with friends outside the neighborhood 
among younger cohorts indicates that social networks are expanding be-
yond neighborhoods. This has the potential to produce a different type of 
social capital that is a better resource in a globalized, information-driven 
society (Quan-Haase and Wellman 2004). 
The results presented above extend our understanding of what is known 
about trends in social capital in three ways. First, the findings confirm that 
trust, but not formal or informal association, has declined, both across co-
horts and across periods. Second, the low levels of trust among cohorts born 
before the pre-boom generation, and the low levels of trust observed in sub-
sequent cohorts, suggest that the generation that matured in the years lead-
ing up to, during and shortly after World War II is unique in its ability to 
promote social capital. Third, though we have relatively little data on “mil-
lennials,” the results support recent research that suggests that Americans 
born since 1980 do not exhibit the same decline in social capital as do pre-
vious birth cohorts (Kiesa et al. 2007). 
There are still many questions about the vitality of social capital. While 
our analysis shows that formal and informal association are relatively stable, 
we know little about the content of this association. What does the move-
ment from interacting with neighbors to interacting with friends outside 
of the neighborhood mean for social capital? This change could have neg-
ative impacts on community health. Have the types of formal associations 
changed? And, if so, what are the implications for social capital? Some schol-
ars argue that the growth of online and national as opposed to local organi-
zations may be detrimental to social capital (e.g. Kraut et al. 1998; Putnam 
2000), while others suggest these types of organizations provide alternative, 
yet useful, forms of social capital (e.g. Minkoff 1997; Wellman et al. 2001). 
While our analysis focuses on changes in social capital, future research can 
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build on these findings by exploring the factors that predict changes in so-
cial capital as well as the effects of changes in social capital. Most impor-
tantly, what are the long-term implications of the decline in trust? 
Future research must address the consequences of the decline in trust 
for the wellbeing of individuals, communities and the nation. Americans 
continue to join voluntary organizations and to interact with friends and 
relatives, but they are less trusting of others in general. Without trust, for-
mal and informal association may increasingly benefit only those who par-
ticipate or a narrow range of beneficiaries rather than the wider commu-
nity and nation.    
Notes 
1. Response rates based on Response Rate 5 defined by the American Association for Public 
Opinion Research (2008). See Smith, Marsden and Hout (2011) for more information on 
sampling and response rates. 
2. We include an additional measure of informal association (spend evening with relatives) 
that Paxton (1999) does not include in her analysis. 
3. We exclude unions because they do not always fit the criteria of voluntary associations. 
While membership in a union is often voluntary, there are some industries and regions 
of the United States where joining a union is not voluntary. 
4. People are helpful based on the question, “Would you say that most of the time people try 
to be helpful, or that they are mostly just looking out for themselves?” People are fair 
based on the question, “Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if 
they got a chance, or would they try to be fair?” People can be trusted based on the ques-
tion, “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t 
be too careful in life?” 
5. Age and period are coded into five-year intervals. The diagonal aspects of the age-by- pe-
riod matrix define birth cohorts. Although this coding is not specific to theories of changes 
in social capital, the intervals are small enough to detect any expected changes. 
6. Wilkes (2011) employs cross-classified random effects models in her analysis of trust. She 
also uses GSS data (1972-2008), but the only unconditional model (i.e., only age, period 
and cohort measures) she reports is of a trust scale rather than individual trust measures. 
Interestingly, Wilkes’ unconditional model shows large across-cohort declines in trust, 
similar to our findings, but little period-based change, while we find large period-based 
declines in two of the three measures of trust. See Schwadel (2010) for a comparison of 
APC analyses using cross-classified models and intrinsic estimator models. 
7. The long civic generation comprises the 1892 through 1927 cohorts, the pre-boom genera-
tion comprises the 1932 through 1942 cohorts, the baby boom generation comprises the 
1947 through 1962 cohorts, Generation X comprises the 1967 through 1977 cohorts, and 
the millennial generation comprises the 1982 and 1987 cohorts. 
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